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The Job
Loss Syndrome
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| Mar
4th 2009, C.P. Chandrasekhar |
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The
message from reports from the ground is clear. Unemployment
in India's industrial and services sectors is on the
rise. If earlier growth was being described as ''jobless'',
the problem now is that growth that is lower comes with
job losses. The recessionary impact that the global
financial and economic crisis has had is resulting in
huge job losses in various segments of the labour market.
However, a reliable aggregate estimate of the extent
of increase in unemployment is not available from the
official statistical system. Recognising that unemployment
is on the rise, the government did make an attempt to
estimate the impact of the downturn on employment. On
its request, the Labour Bureau conducted a sample survey
covering eight sectors (Mining, Textile & Textile
Garments, Metals & Metal Products, Automobile, Gems
& Jewellery, Construction, Transport and the IT/BPO
industry) to arrive at an estimate of job loss. The
survey was designed to cover a sample of units employing
10 or more workers, with the sample being drawn from
20 centres in 11 states and uUnion Territories..
Finally, 2581 units were covered, of which 1168 were
from the Textile & Garments industry, 752 from Metals
& Metal Products, 242 from Information Technology
& Business Process Outsourcing, 132 from Automobiles,
104 from Gems & Jewellery, 103 from Transportation,
19 from Mining, and 61 from Construction. Based on this
limited sample, the total employment in all the sectors
covered by the survey is estimated to have declined
from 16.2 million during September 2008 to 15.7 million
during December 2008, implying a job loss of about half
a million (Table 1). Given the coverage and methodology
of the survey, few believe that this is an acceptable
estimate. The actual decline in employment during this
period is likely to have been much higher. Moreover,
the decline is likely to have occurred over a much longer
period.
However, the survey does suggest that employment fell
in every month during the period studied. After September
2008 employment in all industries declined at an average
rate of 1.01 per cent per month. A comparison of employment
in export and non-export units indicates that employment
declined at an average monthly rate of 1.13 per cent
in the case of the former, as opposed to 0.81 per cent
in the latter (Table 2), pointing to the direct role
of the global slowdown.
Table
1 >> Table
2 >>
With aggregate data being limited, the assessment of
and response to rising unemployment has been driven
by episodic evidence of job loss highlighted by the
media. However, given the nature of India's boom and
the pattern of recent growth it is the loss of white
collar jobs that garners attention from the media. This
was evident when Jet Airways, beleaguered by high oil
prices, increased competition and falling demand, laid
off around a thousand employees. The response to the
announcement was so adverse that the company was forced
to go back on its decision and focus instead on restructuring
its operations and obtaining concessions from the government
to reduce its losses.
Similarly, other labour market developments that have
received and are receiving media attention are evidence
of sluggishness in on-campus recruitment from elite
institutions like the IITs and IIMs, lay-offs and redundancies
in software services and business process outsourcing
firms and evidence of job losses in the Gulf countries.
Much less attention has been paid to job losses of informally
employed blue collar workers in the organized sector
or those dependent on wage- or self-employment in unorganized
manufacturing, services and agriculture.
The attention devoted to white collar jobs in select
sectors is partly understandable, given that the crisis
originated in and affected most of all the financial
sector in the source countries. Moreover, even in India
the crisis hit the financial sector first, being transmitted
through the exodus of foreign financial capital that
withdrew from the country in order to meet commitments
or cover losses incurred by these firms in the source
countries. This impacted immediately on white collar
workers employed in the financial sector. Predictably,
the crisis in the developed countries also affected
workers in the software and IT-enabled Services (ITeS)
sector, because the crisis-afflicted financial industry
in the developed countries was an important outsourcer
of business to India. Software and ITeS, which were
among the fastest growing exports , were also likely
to be the most affected in the wake of a developed country
downturn. Here too the victims of job losses were sections
considered part of the white collar elite.
However, there were more routes than these through which
the crisis was transmitted to India. One, for example,
was the direct impact of the global trade slowdown on
traditional export industries like textiles and garments,
gems and jewellery, leather and carpets. According to
the IMF, the growth of exports from emerging and developing
economies is likely to fall from a positive 9.6 per
cent in 2007 and 5.6 per cent in 2008 to a negative
0.8 per cent in 2009. It is small recompense that the
rate of growth is projected to rebound sharply in 2010.
Such projections are suspect, since the IMF has made
it a habit of putting out optimistic projections and
then revising them downwards. In fact, the 2009 slump
could prove sharper than currently predicted. With traditional
exports still dominating India's manufactured exports,
these industries were bound to be affected most, as
is clearly true in Surat's diamond cutting industry
where low wage workers cater to the world market for
an expensive luxury.
Besides this, the recession is bound to affect demand,
capacity utilization and employment in a wide range
of manufacturing industries catering to the domestic
market. Moreover, growth in a number of areas such as
the housing sector, automobiles and consumer durables
had been driven by credit-financed purchases encouraged
by easy liquidity and low interest rates. The curtailment
of credit provision by a damaged or cautious financial
sector would further reduce demand, increase inventories
and lead to job losses in industries directly or indirectly
catering to such credit-financed investment and consumption.
Influenced by these trends and the second-order of effects
of contraction in these areas on demand for other manufacturing
sectors, there will be a wider range of industries and
segments of the labour market that will be affected
by the ongoing crisis.
Finally, as a result of all these developments, the
demand for agricultural commodities and the viability
of crop production is being increasingly eroded. But
with the government confident that the National Rural
Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) has generated additional
employment in rural areas, the impact that the crisis
is having on employment in agriculture and non-agriculture
in the rural areas is being underplayed. The budget
estimates that the NREGS delivered 13.88 million person
days of additional employment in 2008-09. But this employment
in public works, which definitely needs to be celebrated
and expanded, need not have fully or even substantially
neutralised the loss of routine or regular employment
in rural India, however limited or underpaid such employment
is. The NREGS is a demand-driven scheme and the sharp
increase in employment generated through the scheme
need not only be because the previously unemployed opted
for it, but because those losing jobs are turning to
it as an alternative. If so, the urgency of increasing
allocations substantially is obvious.
Overall, therefore, the unfolding crisis is resulting
in significant job losses across the country, as the
accompanying reports and assessment by Frontline correspondents
attest. What is surprising, however, is the lack of
any sense of urgency on the part of the government in
the face of this crisis. In fact, the initial response
was that since the Indian financial sector was not significantly
exposed to the sub-prime mortgage crisis and the toxic
assets associated with it, the crisis would not impact
India. Subsequently, while it was accepted that India
was indeed being affected, the perception seemed to
be that this effect was largely because of the liquidity
squeeze and credit decline that resulted from the exodus
of foreign capital from the stock market. The government's
response was thus focused on increasing liquidity in
the system and reducing interest rates. The first sign
of the government's recognition that there was a slump
in demand that needed direct action came only in December
2008. Unfortunately, the resulting response was limited,
so that the economy and employment are still slipping.
Yet, even as recently as at the time of the presentation
of the Interim Budget in mid-February, the government
seemed to be complacent. Pranab Mukherjee's budget speech
referred to the effect of the crisis as follows: ''A
crisis of such magnitude in developed countries is bound
to have an impact around the world. Most emerging market
economies have slowed down significantly. India too
has been affected. For the first nine months of the
current year, the growth rate of exports has come down
to 17.1 per cent. According to the latest figures available,
the industrial production has fallen by 2 per cent year-on-year
basis in December 2008. In these difficult times, when
most economies are struggling to stay afloat, a healthy
7.1 per cent rate of GDP growth still makes India the
second fastest growing economy in the world.'' In sum,
the view seems to be, we are not untouched but are faring
relatively well all the same.
A consequence of such complacence is that the interim
budget chose to avoid taking any further steps of significance
to counter the crisis. Such a state of denial is possible
only because public resentment at the effects of the
crisis is just building up. Further, since the strength
of unions has been eroded by casualisation, outsourcing
and high unemployment and the political opposition is
divided, the government is not under pressure to address
the crisis seriously. Despite these possible explanations,
the attitude of the UPA government is puzzling. With
an election nearing and an economic crisis offering
the justification and therefore an opportunity to the
government to spend its way to victory, it is surprising
that the state is still seized by fiscal conservatism.
There could be two explanations for this. The first
could be that the Congress party is actually in a state
of disconnect, having lost its links with the grass
roots and increasingly unconscious of developments on
the ground. With the party having to depend on the prestige
of one family and its scions to garner it votes this
is not unlikely. The situation may be worsened by media
that are disconnected and focused merely on the stock
markets and India's attractiveness to foreign capital.
In the event, the party and UPA government may not even
be cognizing the dimensions of the unfolding crisis.
Unfortunately for it, there is no organized, vocal force
at the moment strong enough to make it recognize reality.
This could mean that a voiceless electorate may be forced
to respond in the coming elections with a mandate that
treats the ''Bharat Nirman'' slogan of the current UPA
government with the same contempt it gave its predecessor's
''India Shining'' campaign.
The second explanation could be that the levers of the
Congress have been seized by fiscally conservative neoliberal
economic ideologues and cynical political satraps, neither
of whom have an inkling of either the current electoral
strength of the Congress or of what needs to be done
to win the forthcoming elections. It is possible that
long years of destruction of the mass mobilisation infrastructure
of the party may have denuded it of those who can forcefully
make the case for alternative policies that can meet
the aspirations of a beleaguered electorate. In the
event, the fiscal conservatives and neoliberals may
have come to dominate the economic discourse, making
a case for reversing the foreign capital drain through
more liberalisation and offering concessions to private
capital, rather than creating the domestic political
space for a national revival and rejuvenation plan.
In either case the loss is national, since there are
no left allies to force the hands of the Congress. This
was what happened in the case of the rural employment
guarantee scheme, which is now being touted as a flagship
scheme that has helped India beat the recession and
praised even by those who had bitterly opposed it earlier.
Without some pressure for more such policies, job losses
will continue, attributed by industry to ''attrition''
and cynical analysts to the inevitable downsizing needed
to enhance competitiveness. It is possible that once
again a surprise mandate may force a course correction,
but that mandate is more than three months away. The
intervening period can be one where the economy and
mass livelihoods suffer damage of a kind that can take
too long to repair.
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